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Abstract—The critical assessment presented within this 
paper explores existing research pertaining to the Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) branch of cyber security, applying the 
knowledge extracted from this research to discuss, evaluate and 
opinionate upon the areas of discussion as well as involving 
personal experiences and knowledge within this field. The 
synthesis of current literature delves into detection capabilities 
and techniques as well as defensive solutions for organisations 
with respect to APTs. Higher-tier detection and defensive 
strategies bear greater importance with larger organisations; 
especially government departments or organisations whose 
work impacts the public on a large scale. Successful APT attacks 
can result in the exfiltration of sensitive data, network down 
time and the infection of machines which allow for remote access 
from Command-and-control (C2) servers. This paper presents 
a well-rounded analysis of the Advanced Persistent Threat 
problem and provides well-reasoned conclusions of how to 
mitigate the security risk.        
Keywords—Advanced Persistent Threat, Cyber security, 
Command-and-control server, MITRE ATT&CK Framework. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As defined by the National Cyber Security Centre of the 
United Kingdom, an Advanced Persistent Threat or APT is a 
“targeted cyber-attack where a hacker accesses a system and 
remains undetected for a long time” [3]. From this definition 
alone, the high likeliness of malicious actors using a variety of 
infiltration techniques to compromise targets can be deduced, 
many of which will be mapped out within the MITRE 
ATT&CK Framework. With the advancement of modern-day 
detection techniques, it can be understood that the complexity 
and sophistication of code produced for these attacks to 
remain undetected must be high. As the APT are well funded, 
organized groups, the production of flawless code for 
delivering payloads come as no issue to these groups [9].  
To understand defensive solutions, a good understanding of 
the motivation empowering APT groups and their attacks is 
required. Within the IEEE Security & Privacy journal, it is 
described how frequently, the primary objective behind these 
attacks is money and the secondary objectives include national 
and industrial espionage [2, 21]. A very famous example of 
national espionage is that of  APT28 whereby, spear-phishing 
attachments were  used to compromise the email accounts of 
government officials during the 2016 United States Election. 
The compromise of Hilary Clinton’s campaign following 
leaked emails are said to have impacted the results within the 
election [11].  
Industry-recognized security expert, Dr, Eric Cole 
explains how organisations understand the traditional 
defensive strategies when such as firewalls. However, these 
traditional approaches experience no success when met with 
an APT attack due to these attacks being a completely 
different problem [4, 9].  From this, it can be argued that 
organisations are struggling to keep up with changes within 
the cyber-industry with respect to the nature of attacks that are 
present. Greater education and emphasis on emerging 
vulnerabilities are things organisations should bear in mind. 
Implementing detective and defensive solutions to specifically 
deal with APT attacks as well as ensuring staff working in 
cyber analyst positions understand what an APT is and how 
the organisations defensive strategies are structured in the 
event they are targeted by an APT group [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saurabh Singh [19] describes the five crucial stages to the 
life cycle of an APT attack. The first step being 
reconnaissance. This is where research pertaining to the 
organisation and its employees. Social networking sites such 
as LinkedIn help to provide the attackers with the information 
they require. The second step is breach. This is where we see 
malware, SQL injections, zero-day vulnerabilities as well as 
other methodologies being used to gain a foothold into the 
network and breach defence systems [8]. The third step is 
infiltration. Now we see the attacker searching for confidential 
data and company documents. They will  move horizontally 
within the network to identify servers and user data. This is 
done with the help of  powerful software tools. Moving to step 
4, exfiltration will take place. The APT group will take control 
of the network and thus, leak confidential company data, 
including intellectual property rights. Data will be transferred 
from the company’s network to an external location, most 
likely a Command-and-Control centre in which the actor(s) 
will control. In the final stage of an APT attack, we tend to see 
stealth persistence being achieved. Providing that the 
exfiltration of data was silent, attackers many choose to 
remain inside the network which will allow them to obtain 
further confidential documents from the organisation over a 
period [10]. 
Throughout the discussion, references to the MITRE 
ATT&CK Framework have been made and will continue to 
be made. This framework breaks down the stages of an attack, 
from initial access up till exfiltration and impact. During the 
Fig. 1: The APT Life Cycle 
discussion of detective and defensive solutions, references to 
the corresponding part of the framework will be made to show 
which stage of an attack that solution tackles. The MITRE 
Corporation describes the framework as a foundation for 
developing specific threat models and methodologies within 
the cybersecurity product and service community [11].  
 
II. DETECTION/DEFENSE TECHNIQUE – 
ANOMALY BASED INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS 
A. OUTLINING ANOMALIES 
What needs to be considered when discussing APT attacks 
is that these attacks are unique and tailored. Traditional 
security methods are bypassed as a result. Anomaly detection 
can be defined as the problem of discovering patterns within 
data that do not conform to what would normally be expected 
[5]. Thus, the ability for anomaly detection within intrusion 
detection systems would contribute to greater success in 
scalping APT attacks. It would provide the opportunity to 
analyse irregular behaviour in the form of abnormal patterns 
within data. Ivo Freidberg [12] describes how anomalies can 
be categorised into three categories. 
1) Point anomalies whereby a single event is identified as 
anomalous with respect to how normality is viewed.  
2) Contextual anomalies whereby a single event is 
identified as anomalous with respect to the context it was 
identified within. 
3) Collective anomalies whereby the relation formed 
collectively between a series of events places them within an 
anomalous bracket. 
 
B. DETECTING ANOMALIES 
Now that a base understanding for anomalies has been 
adopted, the discussion of how to detect these anomalies can 
be brought up. There are various anomaly detection 
algorithms that exist, many of which are predominantly 
known and many of which have been mentioned in journals 
and articles, developed by specialists within the computational 
geometry and cyber-security field.  
An example of one of these algorithms is Classification 
based anomaly detection. This technique uses a classifier or 
model to study a labelled training data set. The learned model 
then classifies a test instance into a class, that being either 
normal or anomalous through using the classifier [5]. The 
general assumption for this algorithm describes the ability for 
a classifier to distinguish between normal and anomalous 
instances of data [12]. 
 
C. VIABILITY OF AN ANOMALY BASED INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEM FOR APT ATTACKS 
A controlled test conducted by Min Qin and Kai Hwang 
[15] from the University of Southern California using an 
anomaly-based intrusion detection system showed that the 
system was able to find unknown attacks embedded within 
telnet, http, ftp and smtp as well as other TCP, UDP or ICMP 
connections. A detection success rate of 47% for denial of 
service attacks, remote-to-local and probe attacks was 
witnessed. In the words of Min and Qin themselves, these 
results prove the viability of an anomaly-based IDS. 
 The major drawbacks which comes with the 
implementation of an anomaly-based IDS is the number of 
false-positives. Any data instance that doesn’t perfectly align 
with the normal class gets categorised as anomalous. Within a 
cyber-security working environment whereby workload is 
often very busy, having to deal with a large instance of false 
positives daily wastes valuable time. As somebody who has 
worked in cyber security for the government for a year as part 
of an industrial placement, I myself have witnessed the 
number of false positives from different sensors that have to 
be dealt with. Introducing an anomaly-based IDS which will 
add on top of the current situation, even more false-positives 
will create a heavier workload for cyber analysts. However, 
looking at this, it could be argued that this could help to create 
and enforce more jobs within firms [13, 14].  
Timothy Shimeall [17] argues that the lack of granularity 
is an issue. The system picks up what it believes to be 
anomalous however, it is not for definite. This ties into the 
point made in the paragraph above which is the high 
production of false-positives. Furthermore, we can tie in how 
the success of the intrusion detection system is heavily 
dependent upon the surroundings in which it learns to 
categorise what normal is. If this stage is rushed or not done 
correctly, false-positive rates could be even higher.  
To conclude on anomaly-based intrusion detection 
systems, they are clever systems that implement 
computational geometry methods and techniques to identify 
outliers within data instances and report this back to the cyber 
team of a company [16]. As APT attacks are unique and 
tailored to companies, the implementation of this system will 
definitely help to detect these attacks and at least make cyber 
teams aware of what is happening, which could help them to 
fight against the stealth persistence stage of the APT cycle in 
the worst-case scenario that confidential documents are 
exfiltrated. Looking at the MITRE ATT&CK Framework, the 
success of an anomaly-based IDS will aid companies at the 
Initial Access stage of the framework, meaning the first stage. 
The Initial Access stage can be said to be equivalent to the 
breach stage of the APT life cycle. This system would be very 
valuable to companies for this very reason. The downside to 
this system is the high false alarm rate [18]. Time is so 
valuable to cyber analysts and increasing their workload to 
deal with a handful of false positives daily may not be the best 
idea. It completely depends upon the nature of the company, 
the size, the financial capabilities and staffing capabilities.  
 
 
III. DETECTION/DEFENCE TECHNIQUE – USER 
AWARENESS OF SPEAR-PHISHING EMAILS 
A. OUTLINING SPEAR-PHISHING 
APT groups have learned that servers are harder to break 
into due to being locked down. What is more effective is to 
target the users who have access to this information [9]. It is 
not hard for malicious actors to obtain personal information 
about several high-level employees within a firm. This is due 
to the amount of information we reveal about ourselves on 
social media, specifically LinkedIn and Facebook. As 
mentioned earlier, I worked for the British government within 
cyber security. Many reconnaissance emails were witnessed 
daily whereby users who had revealed personal information 
about themselves on LinkedIn were being targeted with blank 
emails. You might ask, why would a malicious actor send a 
blank email? Sometimes, it is hard for actors to obtain the 
exact email address whereby you receive your business emails 
[20]. However, so long as they know your name and the 
company you work for, they can discover the email domain 
and predict the start of your email address. They then send 
reconnaissance emails which is a blank email from a non-
suspicious looking address. Many users, being oblivious to 
spear-phishing, reply to these emails asking whether this email 
was meant for them. Once the malicious actor receives a reply, 
they know they have an active address for their target.  
Symantec, a well-known cyber security software company 
reported that spear-phishing attacks in the form of business 
emails are being favoured by malicious actors. Looking at this, 
it can be deduced that one of the underlying causes will be the 
simple fact that humans are easier to compromise than security 
systems. Through social engineering, even the most security 
savvy employee can be fooled [1].  
 
B. CONTROLLING OUR PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 above demonstrates the APT life cycle within the 
context of a spear-phishing attack. What needs to be focused 
on is stages one and two.  By diminishing the ability for 
attackers to collate any background information on 
employees, the company becomes a harder challenge to 
malicious actors who may even reconsider targeting that 
company. This can be done through a variety of techniques. 
As somebody who has worked for the government, the 
following advice is coming from personal experience working 
in a highly controversial organisation. The best strategy would 
be to enforce strict company policies. The type of policies 
which bear disciplinary actions. The first policy should be the 
non-usage of company email addresses for personal usage. 
Using a company email address to sign up to non-work-related 
sites should be banned. Within today’s day and age, 
everybody should have access to a personal address they can 
use for their own activities online. Work matters and personal 
matters should not mix [22, 23]. The second policy that should 
be enforced really depends upon the type of company you 
work for. Although you are aware that I worked for the British 
government, you are not aware which exact government 
department I was a part of. High profile companies who have 
great political impact or who make decisions that may cause 
controversy should make it obligatory on employees to not 
disclose their exact employment details online such as on 
Facebook and LinkedIn. However, more general employment 
details can be disclosed such as their experience within the 
manufacturing industry.  
 
C. EDUCATING EMPLOYEES ON THE ISSUE 
Unfortunately, spear-phishing attacks still take the prize 
for being the most successful attack vector on enterprises [24]. 
Dr Eric Cole [5] explains how the number one reason for 
organisations becoming compromised today is lack of user 
awareness. Due to this, they open attachments that they should 
not. APT groups take advantage of this.  
Looking at this, it can be seen how more focus needs to be 
placed on making users aware of what spear-phishing is. 
When was the last time you worked for a company and was 
given advice on dealing with spear-phishing? Never, right?  If 
users are unaware of the issue, how can it be expected of them 
to deal with it in the correct manner.  
As part of the industrial placement within the government, 
I took part in Learning at Work days whereby I taught and 
presented to new employees the issue of spear-phishing. This 
is a key point. The interaction between cyber analysts and 
other teams needs to be established. Within organisations, 
what tends to happen is you stay within the bubble which is 
your team and you don’t really get to learn about what other 
teams do and the importance of their work. More emphasis 
needs to be placed on the work cyber analysts do. It should be 
well-known to all staff the hard work cyber-analysts commit 
to in order to protect the organisation. One of the ways this 
can be done is through creating that connection between the 
cyber team and other teams within the organisation. The 
ability to pass on critical information such as being mindful of 
opening attachments and enabling macros within spreadsheet 
files is what could save an organisation from being 
compromised by an APT attack. 
The second thing that was taken away from the placement 
which could benefit other organisations is sending out test 
phishing emails. Think about it. You can describe a phishing 
email and all the signs to look out for as best as you can, 
however, until an employee sees a real phishing email, this 
will decipher whether user-education and awareness is 
spreading throughout the organisation. Several of these test 
emails would be sent to users throughout the year, mimicking 
hotel booking companies, florists, clothing retailers. If the user 
clicked on the URL, they would be taken to a site informing 
them about what they have just done and how the URL they 
clicked on could have been malicious. This is usually enough 
to make employees vigilant about what they click on and open 
within emails. If the user forwarded the email to the phishing 
team within the cyber security department, they would receive 
a thank you email explaining to them how their vigilance helps 
to make our organisation a safer environment.  
Looking at the MITRE ATT&CK Framework, the success 
of strict policies and user education will aid companies at the 
Initial Access stage of the framework. Looking at the APT life 
cycle, implementing these defence strategies successfully will 
protect against the reconnaissance and breach stages. 
 
IV. CONCLSION 
Through the research and personal experience working 
with these defence strategies, both techniques bear significant 
Fig. 5: APT Spear-phishing Model 
and critical importance. The anomaly-based IDS gives the 
company the ability to pick up where unusual activities occur 
within their infrastructure. Obtaining the IDS logs within the 
SIEM tool, analysts can reduce data instances to more 
readable formats as well as pin-point monitoring on certain 
data instances. It can give companies that confidence knowing 
they have a system in place for picking up behaviour that 
doesn’t correlate to what they would expect. This technique 
focus purely on network monitoring, placing IDS sensors on 
servers, outlining normal behaviour and creating classes based 
on this knowledge. The strategy is very technical. 
On the contrary, the implementation of strict company 
policies and user-education focuses solely on human 
psychology. The ability to give the workforce what they need 
to not fall victim to social engineering. This strategy is not 
technical but rather, it deals with the issue of APT attacks 
being able to take advantage of the blind-trust humans have of 
emails with embedded URLs and attachments.  
Both defence strategies take two separate routes to tackle 
the same problem, which referring to the MITRE ATT&CK 
Framework, is the Initial Access stage. Being able to prevent 
APT groups gaining a foothold into the network infrastructure 
and move laterally. As mentioned earlier, both are critical for 
preventing successful APT attacks. To choose between 
financial investment between the two would be a hard task for 
any security manager. However, as Dr Eric Cole [9] said, APT 
attacks have become the primary focus for organisations but 
the traditional threat remains. Focus should not be placed on 
protecting against the APT attack to the point where other 
vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise are neglected. 
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